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Borders significantly influence trade  flows, however, the reasons behind  this effect remain largely
unknown.  Since the counter-factual  (absence of borders)  is typically not observable, researchers
have not  been able to  determine  whether the  border  effect is the  result  of trade  barriers,  past
linkages, or is natural-i.e.  the result of comparative advantage or tastes.  The disintegration of the
Soviet Union provides a unique opportunity  to examine these competing hypotheses since one can
observe trade flows between the same partners, both  in the presence and absence of borders.
This  paper offers three  contributions.  First,  we document  the  adjustment  in  trade  flows in
response to the collapse of the Soviet Union and quantify the border effect. We examine bilateral
trade  flows among nine Russian regions and fourteen republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU)
before and after the Union dissolved. Estimating  a gravity equation  we find that  regions did not
trade  more with each other than  with republics in the pre-reform period.  In the  reform period,
however, Russian regions traded  about  60 percent more with each other  than  with the republics,
with  the  domestic bias  increasing over time.  Thus,  the  disintegration  of the  Soviet Union has
already led to  a significant domestic reorientation in trade.  We also find that  the  elasticities of
trade  to income and  distance, in the pre-reform period,  are markedly smaller than  those typically
found in empirical work using the gravity equation.  In the reform period, however, the elasticities
are similar to those from studies  of other  countries.  It  thus  appears  that  the  decline of central
planning has allowed gravity to set in, and now income and distance influence trade flows in a more
standard  way in the FSU.
Second, we distinguish the primary  causes of the border  effect.  We find that  the importance
of the  Russian  border  is primarily  the  result  of trade  barriers.  The  inclusion of tariffs in  the
estimation  reduces the bias to where it is insignificantly different from zero. When heterogeneity
2across countries is allowed, we find that  trade  flows between Russian regions and countries which
signed a  free trade  agreement  with  Russia remain similar to  intra-Russian  trade  in the  reform
period, implying that  national borders alone have not diverted trade  flows in the FSU.
Third,  our results  also suggest that  slow adjustment  of production  and  of infrastructure  has
limited trade  reorientation.  Using past trade to proxy for linkages developed when the Soviet Union
was integrated,  we find that  past  linkages significantly influence current trade.  Since past  trade
was centrally planned  it is unlikely that  we are picking up other  unobserved persistent  variables,
such as tastes or comparative advantage. As linkages with other republics continue to atrophy, the
domestic trade  bias will increase to well over the 60 percent we estimate  currently.
Our estimate of the border effect is significantly lower than similar estimates using OECD data,
despite  greater trade  barriers  in the  FSU. Using inter-provincial and  province-state  trade  data,
McCallum (1995) and Helliwell (1996) find that  in 1990 Canadian provinces traded  about twenty
times  more among themselves than  with  U.S. states.  More recently, Helliwell (1998) estimates
the bias to be twelve in 1996 following  the preferential trading agreement (PTA) between the two
countries.1 Wei (1996) and Helliwell (1998) estimate that  the domestic trade  bias among OECD
countries ranges from three to twelve. 2 One explanation that  is consistent with both  sets of results
is that  past  linkages have led to a continued domestic orientation  in trade  in the  OECD, despite
falling trade  barriers, and  sustained integration in the FSU in spite of rising trade  barriers.
'An alternative way to evaluate the border effect is with price data.  Engel and  Rogers (1996) examine the
relative price variability of similar goods among cities in Canada and the United States.  They find that  relative price
variability  between cities is significantly greater when a border is crossed.
2Wei (1996) develops a technique  to  estimate  the  domestic  bias in trade  using input-output  tables  to estimate
internal  trade  for countries  without  regional  data.  He  assumes that  internal  trade  distances  are one-quarter  the
distance  between a country  and its  nearest  trade  partner,  to  estimate  the  border  effect.  One problem  with  this
method  is that  the border  estimate  is proportional  to the assumed internal  trade  distance.
3The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature  on the border effect. Section
3 discusses the empirical specification and results.  Section 4 concludes.
2  Why  do  borders  matter?
Empirical studies on the effects of borders are uniform in finding a  high domestic bias in trade.
It  remains a puzzle as to why borders matter  so much.  Three hypotheses have been put forward
in the literature:  (i) international  trade  barriers, (ii) natural  partners,  and  (iii) historical linkages.
The  first implies borders  matter  because of tariffs,  quotas,  and  other  barriers  to  trade.  Trade
barriers raise the relative price of imported goods and lead to a consumption bundle biased towards
domestically produced goods.
Alternatively, borders  may be endogenous.  Owing to comparative advantage, tastes,  or tech-
nology, regions within a border may simply be natural  trade  partners.  Borders tend  to be formed
around populations that  are relatively homogeneous, have similar tastes, and in which the regional
economies are linked.  These associated regions may  create  borders  to  protect  themselves from
external shocks.
Finally, cross-border trade  may be relatively small because past isolation has led to domestically
oriented infrastructure  and production.  For example, highways, rail systems, legal and regulatory
institutions,  business networks and  consumer networks, and  telecommunications systems all differ
across countries and thus may increase the costs of international  trade  relative to domestic trade.
Assuming infrastructure  is costly to adjust,  a history of isolation will depress trade while historical
linkages to other nations  will help promote current trade.  Similarly, if capital adjustment  across
industries is costly then an economy with primarily domestically oriented industry will adjust slowly
to external pressure.
4A growing empirical literature finds that historical linkages are important  determinants  of trade.
Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) show that  countries with colonial links and countries with common
language trade  more with each other than  the gravity model predicts.  Frankel (1997) surveys the
literature  on the dissolution of (British and French) colonial links and  the breakup of federations
(the Austro-Hungarian  Empire, the  Malay Federation,  Czechoslovakia, the former  Soviet Union)
and finds "a tendency for established bilateral  trade  ties to change relatively slowly" (p.126).  He
notes,  however, the  tenuous nature  of these  findings derived  from trade  intensity  ratios  which
do  not  control for the  effects of distance  and  income.  Eichengreen and  Irwin  (1998) find that
lagged bilateral trade  is significant in determining current bilateral trade  in a large cross-section of
countries, after controlling for inpome and distance, and interpret this as evidence that past linkages
adjust only slowly to new conditions. Also indicative of the importance of historical linkages, Freund
(2000) finds that  the founding members of the European Union created  a well-integrated market
among themselves and then  maintained  stronger  trade  links with each other  than  with  countries
that  joined later.  There was no evidence of a bias in trade  towards the  original members before
the common market was formed.
3  Empirical  specification
The FSU provides a unique case study because in the pre-reform period infrastructure  and technol-
ogy were uniform across regions and republics, there were no trade barriers,  and trade was centrally
planned.  In the reform period,  borders have been erected, large tariffs are in place, and  central
planning has been abandoned; but, transport  costs, infrastructure,  and  technology are likely to be
slow to change. This allows us to examine how past integration affects current trade and how tariffs
influence trade, when there are no differences in infrastructure  and history. That  is, any correlation
5between pre-reform trade  and current trade, after controlling for size and distance, must be largely
a result of historical  linkages and not the result of unobservables such as comparative advantage
and tastes.
3.1  The  Data
We examine trade  among 9 regions in Russia and  14 former republics of the Soviet Union before
and  after disintegration.  The  trade  data  are from the Russian  State  Statistical  Committee  and
the  World Bank and  include bilateral  trade  flows among regions and  republics, in U.S. dollars.
Income figures are from the World Bank and are also in U.S. dollars.  Distance is taken from the
Russian Ministry of Transport  tables as the shortest road distance  in kilometers between regional
and/or  republican centers. Unweighted average ad-valorem tariff rates are published by the EBRD.
Population  figures are from the World Bank.  (See the Appendix for a detailed description of the
data  and a map of the region.)
There are two weaknesses in the data.  First,  because of central planning, the pre-reform trade
values are not market values. Since we are comparing across regions and republics all of which are
within the same country and subject to the same prices, they are nevertheless valuable estimates of
relative trade between partners.  The second problem is the presence of barter  trade, which became
quite common in the FSU in the reform period.  Barter  trade  is recorded in the dataset,  however
the prices at  which it is recorded are likely to be biased downwards in order to  avoid taxes and
tariffs. Again since we are comparing trade within the FSU, this is less of a problem because barter
trade  is likely to be as prevalent among regions as between regions and  republics (see Appendix).
Therefore, although the magnitudes of trade  are likely to be distorted, there  is no reason to think
that  relative trade among parties within the FSU is systematically biased.  If we included non FSU
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Figure 1: Exports to other FSU countries relative to total exports
Figure 1 shows each country's share of total excports  that go to other FSU countries. FSU export
shares have declined for all but three former members-Azerbaijan,  Belarus, and Uzbekistan. This
suggests that  a significant reorientation of trade  away from FSU countries has occurred since the
disintegration of the FSU.
Our interest, however, lies primarily with the domestic reorientation of trade  within Russia, so
we also document the share of total FSU trade  for each region and each republic that is with Russia.
In the pre-reform period, on average 65 percent of each region's trade  with the FSU countries was
with other Russian regions and trade  shares were flat (Figure 2). In the reform period, the share of
trade  that  is inter-regional rises to about 80 percent, for all regions. The republics'  share of FSU
trade  with  the Russian regions is about  50 percent  in the pre-reform period  and fairly constant
(Figure 3). In the reform period, regional trade  shares change dramatically.
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Figure 2: Share of total FSU trade  with Russia by region
While the movement in trade  shares over time is suggestive of an increasing domestic bias in
trade,  shares alone do not tell us whether regions trade  relatively more among themselves, we need
to  control for standard  determinants  of trade.  For example,  the  increased Russian  trade  share
among the regions may be the result of relatively higher income growth.  Next, we use a simple
gravity specification which is comparable to the models in McCallum (1995) and  Helliwell (1996,
1998) to estimate  the extent  of domestic bias in trade.  After estimating the benchmark model, we
account for country specific effects, tariffs, and history.
3.2  The  benchmark  specification
We use a gravity equation  to examine trade  within Russia.  The gravity equation  describes trade
between two parties  as proportional  to the  product  of their  incomes divided by the distance  be-
tween them.  Theoretical models supporting  the  gravity equation  are numerous.  In particular,
the monopolistic competition model and Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade  both produce estimating
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Figure 3: Share of total FSU trade  with Russia by republic
equations similar to the gravity equation describing bilateral  trade  flows (Deardorff 1998).
We estimate a gravity equation on 1987-1990  and  1994-1996  trade  flows among and between 9
Russian regions and the  14 republics of the Soviet Union. The regression equation for each year in
log levels is:
TRADEi  = a +  oYi  + I3Yj + 32DISTij  + j3RUSSIA  + u,i  (1)
where TRADEij  is the log of shipments from region i to region j,  Yi and Yj are the logs of gross
regional product  in  regions i and  j  respectively, DISTij  is the  log of the  distance  from i to  j,
RUSSIA  is a dummy equal to one for intra-Russian  trade  and zero for region to republic trade,
and uij is the error term,  which we assume is uncorrelated  across observations.  The RUSSIA
variable pools all effects that  make cross-border trade  different from domestic trade  (Table 1).
The coefficient on  the  RUSSIA  dummy  rises noticeably  from the  pre-reform period  to  the








Figure  4:  Domestic  Bias  in Russian  Trade
Russian  regions  traded  58  percent  more  with  each  other  than  is  predicted  by  the  model  (exp
0.46  =  1.58).  In  the  pre-reform  period,  the  regions  did  not  trade  more  with  each  other.  In  fact,
though  not  significant,  the  coefficient  is negative  in each  year.  Figure  4 documents  the  estimated
bias  towards  intra-national  trade  in Russia  over time  as  calculated  from  the  estimated  coefficient
on  RUSSIA  in the  benchmark  model.  Russian  trade  displays  an  increasing  domestic  bias  after
1994.3
The  insignificant  (and  negative)  bias  in trade  between  Russian  regions  in the  pre-reform  period
is not  surprising  given  that  trade  was centrally  planned  across  all  of the  FSU  and  there  were  no
borders.  The move  away from central  planning  is also noticeable  in Table  2.  In all specifications  we
3We also organize the data  into two panels, a pre-reform period  (1987-1990) and a reform period  (1994-1996)  and
use OLS and random effects (not reported).  The regression is based on equation  (1), with an added  time dimension.
These results  confirm our earlier estimates-the  coefficient on RUSSIA  was not significant  in the pre-reform period
and in the reform period the OLS results estimate  the bias to be 50 percent  and the random effects estimate the bias
to be 60 percent.
10find that  the elasticity of trade with respect to income and distance increases after disintegration.
For example, the coefficient on distance more than  doubles in magnitude from -0.42 to -1.16. This
change is hardly  surprising - pre-reform trade  over long distances was heavily subsidized.  The
coefficients in the reform period are much closer to the coefficients typically found on estimates of
the  gravity model. 4 This suggests that  gravity has set in and that  trade  patterns  in the FSU are
now determined in a similar way to the rest of the world.
Since GNP is not exogenous with respect to trade we also use population to instrument for GDP.
The results are shown in Table 2. The coefficients on income are higher.  The reorientation within
Russia is still evident from the  change in significance of the  Russia dummy over time.  Russian
regions are significantly less likely to trade  with one-another in the pre-reform period and this bias
disappears in the reform period.
3.3  Allowing  for heterogeneity  across  countries
Non-tariff barriers,  currency  variability,  and  differences in wages and  prices across regions and
republics may affect trade.  To allow for this  possible heterogeneity, we split  the  sample into two
panels-pre-reform  and reform-and  use country fixed effects in the  estimation.  We exclude inter-
republic trade from the sample and estimate equation (2) separately for the pre-reform and reform
periods,
TRADE,j,t  = at + I3yij + 3lYit +  32Yjt  + / 3DISTij  + uij,  (2)
where -yij  is a country dummy. The dummy for Armenia, for example, is one when Armenia is either
an exporter  or an importer.  Since inter-republic trade  is excluded and  all republics are dummied
4Most comparable is the Canada U.S. study  since trade in North America is also land-based trade.  McCallum  1995
and Helliwell 1998 find the elasticity  of trade  to distance  on Canada-U.S.  data  is between -1.23 and -1.62. Helliwell
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Figure 5: Russian bias against former republics
out, the coefficient on the Armenia dummy represents how much more or less Armenia trades with
the  Russian regions relative to  how much the  Russian  regions trade  among  themselves.  In the
pre-reform period,  the Russian  bias against Armenia is 0.73 (1/exp(O.31) =  0.73), implying the
regions trade  about 27 percent less with each other as compared to with Armenia.  In the reform
period, they trade  70 percent more with each other than with Armenia (a bias of 1.7). A coefficient
of zero means that  there is no bias (the bias equals 1). Figure 5 shows the bias against each former
republic in both  periods. In the pre-reform period, seven of the republics trade  significantly more
with Russia than  is predicted by the model, three  do not trade  significantly more or less, and the
remaining four trade  significantly less.
Earlier  results suggested that  the Russian regions did not trade  more with  each other in the
pre-reform period,  yet traded  more with each other  than  with other  FSU members in the reform
12period.  This  is confirmed here, with no single country  driving the  results.  Trade between the
Russian regions and all republics, except Kazakhstan, fell from the pre-reform to the reform period.
The countries that  experienced the greatest declines in trade with the Russian regions are Georgia,
Turkmenistan,  Lithuania,  Latvia,  Azerbaijan and Armenia, in that  order.  Located directly south
of Chechnya, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan suffered as a result of the Chechen war. Lithuania
and Latvia have consciously followed a policy of integration  into Western Europe.
The coefficients on Belarus and Kazakhstan  are both positive in the reform period, suggesting
that  both countries still trade  at least as much with Russian regions as regions trade  among them-
selves. These two countries alone signed a free trade agreement with Russia. This implies that  the
Russian bias in trade  may be largely a.  result of trade barriers.
3.4  Estimating  the  effect  of tariffs  and  adjustment  costs
The benchmark model used to estimate the trade  bias (equation (1)) includes distance  as a proxy
for transport  costs and a  dummy variable (RUSSIA)  to estimate  possible excess trade  between
Russian regions. The question is how to interpret  the positive coefficient on the  dummy variable
in the  reform period.  It  could be picking up  other  parts  of trade  costs besides distance  related
transport  costs or it could be picking up trade  barriers.  Alternatively, it may represent differences
in factor endowments, tastes, or technology.
In  this  section we attempt  to  examine the  effect of tariffs  and  past  linkages on  trade.  We
incorporate tariff levels into the benchmark equation  as the  log of one plus the  ad-valorem tariff
5We perform further  robustness  tests by looking at  trade  with other  regions versus trade  with republics  for each
region.  Each regression is run on a region's trade  with  all of its trading  partners.  For all regions we find that  trade
with the other  regions relative to the  republics expanded  - no single region is driving our results.
13rate  in the  importer  country  (TARIFF). 6 Two PTAs were ratified  in the  reform period:  one
between Russia, Kazakhstan,  and Belarus and another between Estonia, Latvia,  and Lithuania, so
the ad valorem tariff is zero whenever trade is between any of these country pairs or among regions.
The bias towards Russian goods, either as a result of non-tariff barriers,  preferences, or price and
wage differentials is now controlled for by the RUSSIA  dummy.
The results are reported in Table 2. The inclusion of the tariff variable eliminates the significance
of RUSSIA.  This indicates that  trade  policy is the main cause of lower trade  among regions and
republics. The coefficient can be interpreted  as the elasticity of trade with respect to the tariff. The
coefficients on the tariff rate  of -1.2 in 1994 and -1.65 in 1996 imply that  the elasticity of trade  to
the tariff is increasing in absolute value over time.  This is consistent with there being adjustment
costs in reorienting production  and infrastructure.  The impact on trade  is relatively small when
the tariff is initially imposed, as time goes on and infrastructure and production are reoriented, the
magnitude of its effect rises.
Next we also include a variable describing past linkages (LINKS).  Past linkages exist through-
out the FSU as a result of central  planning.  For example, there  are highly integrated  production
and consumption chains, infrastructure  for trade,  and business networks all of which are likely to
change slowly, and all of which lead to greater current trade  than  in their absence.
We assume that  the  current linkage between two areas is an increasing function of their past
trade:
LINKAGEijt  = F(Mijt-1,  Mijt-2  Mijt-3,..).
The  intuition  is that  greater  trade  in the  past  generated  more investment  and  hence a  larger
capital stock (in terms of production  and  infrastructure)  geared toward that  trade.  For a model
6This format can be derived from a model where tariflf enter multiplicatively, such as a differentiated  goods model.
14that  develops a similar intuition  see Bougheas et.  al.  (1999).  They  show that  if infrastructure
lowers transport  costs, then  infrastructure  and the volume of trade will be positively correlated in
a Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson model. While they model specific infrastructure  for transport,  we
have in mind a more general notion of linkages through physical infrastructure,  production chains,
and business contacts.
As a result of central  planning, trade  in the pre-reform period was very similar across years,
as evidenced by Table 1. We thus assume that  linkages will be positively correlated  with centrally
planned  trade  from the  pre-reform period.  This  implies that  we can  include pre-reform  trade
patterns  as a measure of current linkages for trade.
The regressions including past  trade  are reported  in the final three  columns of Table 3.  The
significance of 1987 trade  in the regression equation for 1996 implies that  a  great deal of current
trade  is still determined  by past  trade  patterns.  That  is, past  linkages have limited the  bias on
current trade.  Specifically,  the results imply that  1 percent increase in trade in 1987 leads to about
half of one percent increase in current trade.
One problem with including past  trade  is that  it may  also be  correlated  with  current  trade
because of other  persistent  variables  that  are not  included  in the  regression equation,  such as
endowments or technology, but that  are not related to past  linkages. 7 This is likely to be less of
an issue in this data  because trade  in the pre-reform period was centrally planned  and  not based
on comparative advantage. In addition,  the countries in our study were trade  partners  by default,
trading  little with countries outside the  Union.  Therefore, disintegration  implies that  the set of
countries over which comparative advantage is determined is greater.  In addition, economies have
changed dramatically  since 1992, some economies have grown while others  have shrunk, countries
7Wonnacott  (1998) highlights  this  problem  in his discussion of Eichengreen  and  Irwin's  (1998) paper  on trade
flows, which was the  first to incorporate  past  trade  into the  gravity equation.
15now have different currencies, and prices are no longer equalized across regions and republics.
Still, as a  robustness check, we use the  fitted values of past  trade  from the  simple gravity
equation  in the regression (Column five of Table 3).  The results  remain robust  implying that  a
significant amount of current trade  is determined by past linkages.
3.4.1  Interpretation  and  Implications  for the  Future
The results in this paper show that  trade has been reoriented within Russia, primarily as a result of
trade  barriers, and that  trade flows  within the FSU are still significantly impacted by past linkages.
We have also shown that the elasticity of trade with respect to tariffs increases over time, likely as a
result of a reorientation of production, infrastructure,  and networks. This implies that  the Russian
bias we estimate  will continue to increase over time.  Decreasing trade  between Russian regions
and  republics will affect production,  infrastructure  maintenance and  development, and business
networks.  As these linkages for trade  deteriorate,  the  cost of international  trade  will increase,
which will cause trade between FSU countries to decline further.
At present this process is likely show up in only marginal improvements or neglect of existing
infrastructure.  To examine the extent to which this process has begun, we first examine passenger
train speed within the FSU as a proxy for investment in infrastructure that links regions to republics,
and then  we discuss how nascent  projects  in the FSU countries are likely to alter  international
linkages.8
Using train schedules between FSU countries and Russian regions, we find that  trains got faster
between most Russian regions from 1989  to 1996,  and trains to the former republics slowed. Table 4
reports the average percent change in time of travel between and among regions and republics from
8Train  schedules  for 1989  and 1996  are from the National Railways  archives  in Moscow.
161989 to 1996. While travel times between regions and republics and  among republics lengthened;
travel times among the Russian regions were nearly all shorter in 1996 as compared with 1989 (last
column in Table 4).  For example, a train  from the North region to the republics took 4.9 percent
longer on average in 1996 as compared with 1989; but a train from the North to the other Russian
regions took 2.0 percent less time on average in 1996 than  in 1989. The largest travel time increase
was between Chernozyom and  Uzbekistan; it  took 41  percent longer to  travel  between the  two
capitals in 1996. The sharpest  decline was between Central Russia and  Chernozyom; it took  7.2
percent less time to travel between the two capitals in 1996 as compared with  1989. This suggests
that trains in Chernozyom have been reoriented towards Moscow  and away from the southern route
to Uzbekistan.
Changes in travel times were accompanied by a change in the frequency of service. The frequency
of trains traveling between Russian regions have for the most part remained constant  or improved,
but train service from regions to republics has become less frequent.  These results suggests both
that infrastructure  between regions and republics is deteriorating and that  connections for business
travel across national borders are less frequent. While this is probably partially  a result of declining
trade, it is also likely to increase the costs of international trade and hence facilitate the reorientation
in trade.
Reorientation  of infrastructure  is also evident in the  new projects  and  agreements that  have
emerged in most FSU countries.  One striking example is the  move of the  Kazakh  capital  from
Almaty  (in the south) to  Astana (in the north)  and  the construction of a highway and a railroad
to link the two cities. Latvia and Estonia  are also building a fast train  link between their capitals.
Belarus and Russia recently agreed to deeper economic and political integration, the accord includes
currency unification and enacting unified customs regulations.  These projects and  agreements are
17likely to affect trade patterns in the FSU in the years to come. As these new linkages are developed
and past linkages atrophy, the domestic bias in Russian trade will surely increase.
4  Conclusions
In the  days of the  Soviet Union, trade  was centrally planned, trade  links between regions and
republics were very strong,  and  the  regions did not trade  more with  each other  than  with the
republics. The collapse of cerntral  planning along with the disintegration of the Soviet Union have
induced a change in the determinants  of trade.  As gravity has set in, the elasticities of trade  to
income and  distance have risen and  are now similar to those found in the rest  of the world.  In
addition, an increasing bias towards domestic trade in Russia has developed. Specifically,  we show
that  Russian regions traded  60 percent more with each other than  with former republics in 1996.
This bias is primarily due to the erection of tariff barriers.
The border effects we estimate are. lower than  in previous studies because infrastructure and
production have not been domestically reorganized in the short  period since the collapse of the
Soviet Union. That is, the intra-national bias has been mitigated through strong historical linkages
that  Russian regions have to former Soviet republics and costs of adjustment to redirecting trade
and building new infrastructure.  The erection of political borders, however, will likely be followed
by the development of new economic borders.  This implies that  the domestic bias in Russia (and
in the new republics) will grow over time.
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5  Appendix:  Data
5.1  Trade  Flows
Data on inter-regional and inter-republican trade flows in the Soviet Union were collected consis-
tently starting  in 1964. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992,  the Russian State Statistics
Committee (Goskomstat) with the assistance of the World Bank continued the collection and pub-
lication of inter-republican trade  flow data  (World Bank, various issues).  Inter-regional data on
net trade flows for Russia are published in the Regionii v Rossii yearbook, starting  in 1987. Gross
trade flow data for the regions are only available from internal Goskomstat publications.
All data  are available for 1987-1990,  and  1993-1996. We exclude 1993 from the analysis data
because 40 percent of the observations were missing and  trade  flows were only reported  in each
former republic's newly introduced currency, which made conversion to US dollars difficult. The
1987-90  data were reported in Russian rubles and converted into US dollars using the black market
exchange rate for 1990-1  ruble equaled 0.38 $U.S.-as reported in World Bank (1994). The 1994-96
data  were reported in U.S. dollars.  Two Russian regions (East and  West Siberia) were excluded
from the dataset due to many missing values in the 1994-96  period.
Two possible biases exist in the data:  one related  to barter  transactions,  and one related to
21unrecorded trade.  Barter transactions are recorded in a special section of the customs declarations
(for cross-border trade)  and supplier invoices (for intra-Russian trade).  Suppliers are required to
price their merchandise at the prevailing market price in the country of origin plus a price premium
as a penalty  for non-cash payment.  The price premia  are included in the  invoice.  There  is an
incentive to report  lower values of the merchandise in both  intra-Russian  and cross-border trade
to  avoid payment  of value-added taxes.  The  incentive, however, may be  somewhat stronger  in
cross-border transactions  since consignments are levied with customs duties and an additional 20
percent value-added tax.  Trade flows are further  biased downward due to unrecorded trade,  i.e.,
shipments which cross the border but whose owners avoid payments of duties and taxes by bribing
customs officials.
In his study on the breakup of federations, Frankel (1997) argues that  the partial  reliance on
barter transactions in the FSU reduces trade with other partners and hence serves to maintain the
domestic bias in trade.  This  argument only applies to outward  trade,  i.e.  trade  with non-FSU
partners.  Barter trade  would reduce the intra-Russian  domestic bias in our sample only if it were
more pervasive in cross-border trade between Russian and say Ukrainian enterprises than in trade
between enterprises in different Russian regions. This is, however,  not consistent with the enterprise
survey evidence (World Bank, 1998). Barter transactions were as least as common within Russia.
5.2  Income  Data
The GDP data for republics come from World Bank (various years).  Again, as in the trade  data,
1987-90  values are reported  in Russian rubles and  converted to US dollars using the  1990 black
market exchange rate.  The  1994-96 numbers are reported  in both  local currencies and  US dol-
lars. We use Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik (Goskomstat, various years) to complement our
republican data with data for the nine Russian regions.
22The income data  display significant changes over the sample period, with a precipitous initial
drop and  a subsequent  steady increase in the reform period.  In contrast,  the  pre-reform period
was marked by stagnant  income growth.  By  1996, four republics (Estonia,  Kazakhstan,  Latvia,
and Lithuania) and five Russian regions (North, Northwest, Central, Volga, and  Ural) had reached
GDP  levels (in dollar terms) higher than  in 1987. At the opposite extreme, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Moldova, and Tajikistan  fell to half of their  1987 levels by 1996.
5.3  Distance  and  train  schedules
We use the road travel guide (Ministerstvo Transporta,  1990) to construct  a distance matrix.  Dis-
tance is measured in kilometers and covers the shortest distance between two regional or republican
centers.  This measure is superior to by-air distance since it accounts for the level of development of
Soviet infrastructure.  The longest distance between two economic centers is 9,687 kilometers from
Latvia to the Fareast region of Russia.
Passenger  train data  for 1996 and  1989 are from the  National  Railways archives in Moscow
(unpublished data).
5.4  Trade barriers
While a  dozen different PTAs have been negotiated  between and  among former  Soviet republics
(EBRD,  1997), only two such agreements - between Estonia, Latvia,  and  Lithuania; and Belarus,
Kazakhstan,  and  Russia - were ratified by the respective parliaments  and implemented.  The av-
erage  unweighted tariff  levels between  the other  republics ranges between  4 and  30 percent  ad
valorem, with Estonia,  Armenia, and  Lithuania being the  most open and  Azerbaijan, Tajikistan,
and  Turkmenistan having the highest protection.
Non-tariff barriers  are  pervasive among  the  former  republics.  Interviews with  managers of
23exporting firms done by the authors during visits to ten of the republics identified several types
of such barriers.  Long delays at  the border and onerous paper requirements by customs officers
can  be (and often are) avoided by  means of bribes.  This  adds to  the cost  of the consignment
between 1 percent (Kyrgyz customs officials  being the cheapest) and 6 percent (in Uzbekistan) on
average.  Transit transport  through a country, or even through a region within the same country
can also increase costs substantially. Interviews with Kazakh businessmen reveal that  their trucks
are routinely stopped and  fined several times when entering Uzbekistan.  Moldovan businessmen
report  that  transit  transport  through Ukraine and  into Russia is levied with a deposit, equal to
100 percent of the consignment value, on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border.  The payment has to be
made in Ukrainian currency.  Foreigners cannot, however, own Ukrainian  currency above certain
limits and hence they have to exchange money at the border, and then exchange money back when
entering  Russia.  In the  currency exchange process, an  average of 7 percent  of the value of the
consignment is added to  costs.  Kyrgyz businessmen report that  in one-quarter  of the cases they
never get the  deposit back.  In addition,  many countries charge foreigners higher rates  for rail
transport.  Finally, all enterprises in countries which have not signed PTAs with Russia are forced
to pay value-added taxes (of 20 percent) twice-once when they produce goods in their own country
and a second time when goods cross the border with Russia.
24Table 1: Benchmark Specification
1987  1988  1989  1990  1994  1995  1996
Yi  0.76*  0.77*  0.77*  0.75*  0.93*  0.88*  0.88*
(28.5)  (28.4)  (28.5)  (29.0)  (17.7)  (15.2)  (16.6)
Yi  0.72*  0.72*  0.72*  0.73*  0.90*  0.89*  0.82*
(27.2)  (27.2)  (27.4)  (29.0)  (15.1)  (17.3)  (16.1)
DIST  -0.42*  -0.42*  -0.42*  -0.42*  -0.98*  -1.05*  -1.16*
(-12.2)  (-12.0)  (-12.0)  (-12.4)  (-15.6)  (-16.5)  (-16.5)
RUSSIA  -0.12  -0.10  -0.11  -0.15  0.31*  0.42*  0.46*
(-1-6)  (-1.3)  (-1.3)  (-1.9)  (2.33)  (3.1)  (3.5)
No. of obs.  504  502  495  494  492  486  487
Adj R-square  0.81  0.81  0.81  0.82  0.70  0.70  0.72
*Significant  at the 5 percent level. Heteroskedasticity corrected t-statistics  axe in parentheses.
All regressions run with a constant, values for the constants are not reported.
25Table 2: Estimation with Population  as Instrumental  Variable for Income
1987  1990  1994  1995  1996
Yi  0.83*  0.82*  1.14*  1.14*  1.10*
(26.8)  (27.8)  (16.9)  (15.0)  (15.6)
Yi  0.84*  0.83*  1.05*  1.05*  1.04*
(27.2)  (27.9)  (15.6)  (15.1)  (16.2)
DIST  -0.41*  -0.41*  -0.96*  -1.02*  -1.12*
(-11.6)  (-11.9)  (-14.8)  (15.0)  (-15.1)
RUSSIA  -0.35*  -0.3 4*  0.20  -0.15  -0.11
(-3.8)  (-4.0)  (1.21)  (-0.88)  (-0.70)
No. of obs.  504  494  492  486  487
Adj R-square  0.81  0.82  0.69  0.69  0.71
*Significant at the 5 percent level. Heteroskedasticity corrected t-statistics  are in parentheses.
Population is used as instruments  for income.
All regressions run with a constant, values for the constants are not reported.
26Table 3: Estimating  the Effect of Tariffs and Adjustment Costs
1994  1995  1996  1996  1996  1996
(OLS)  (OLS)  (OLS)  (OLS)  (TSLS)  (OLS)
Yi  0.89*  0.86*  0.79*  0.51*  0.61*  0.48*
(14.6)  (16.3)  (15.1)  (7.1)  (6.1)  (6.6)
Yi  0.91*  0.85*  0.85*  0.55*  0.66*  0.52*
(16-9)  (14.2)  (15.6)  (7.7)  (6.1)  (7.2)
DIST  -0.98*  -1.05*  -1.20*  -0.92*  -0.99*  -0.92*
(-15.9)  (-16.9)  (-16.8)  (-12.8)  (-12.5)  (-13.2)
RUSSIA  0.02  0.08  0.07  0.46*  0.46*  0.08
(0.2)  (0.5)  (0.4)  (3.8)  (3.8)  (0.5)
TARIFF  -1.20*  -1.46*  -1.65*  -1.64*
(-2.7)  (-3.0)  (-3.2)  (-3.2)
PTRADE  0.57*  0.39*  0.57*
(6.1)  (2.6)  (6.1)
No. of obs.  492  486  487  486  486  486
Adj R-square  0.70  0.70  0.72  0.74  0.74  0.75
*Significant at the 1 percent level. Heteroskedasticity corrected t-statistics  are in parentheses.
All regressions run with a constant, values for the constants axe not reported.
27Table 4: Average Percent  Change in Travel Time 1996-1989
Between Republics  and Republicsa  and Russiab  Between Regions  and Republicsa  and Russiab
Armenia  5.9  5.3  North  4.9  -2.0
Azerbaijan  7.2  5.1  Northwest  6.3  -2.8
Belarus  9.3  2.2  Central  5.4  -3.1
Estonia  6.2  5.7  Chernozyom  8.5  -1.9
Georgia  7.2  8.9  Caucases  5.9  -2.0
Kazakstan  6.8  5.5  Volga  6.1  -0.6
Kyrgistan  6.1  8.8  Volga-Vyatka  5.4  -2.1
Latvia  5.8  4.5  Ural  5.4  -2.0
Lithuania  2.7  4.5  Fareast  4.5  0.1
Moldova  8.8  7.5
Tajikistan  7.4  4.5
Turkmenistan  5.2  4.3
Ukraine  6.4  5.9
Uzbekistan  6.7  11.1
a. The average percent change in travel time between the capitol of the region or the republic
and the capitols of all other republics. b.The average percent change in travel time between
the capitol of the region or the republicand the capitols of Russian regions.
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